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social advances" is stressed as of great importa11ce m combating
these destructive influences.
The fact that juv.enile crime has increased fifty per cent in England since the war is cited as evidence of this lapse in social control
and the author warns that the United States must take action if it
is "to avoid the mistakes which England has made" in handling this
and similar problems.
Finally the effects of war upon the psychological needs of the
individual are briefly considered. Of these, the inculcation of fear
and insecurity, the denial of normal contacts and affection, and the
limitation of satisfying achievement are viewed as of particular concern.
It is concluded that there is no single approach to the problem
of strengthening the personality of youth but that all the factors of
the life situation must be considered.
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The responsibility for the maintenance of national morale in
times of war rests partly on the government and partly on the
people. For the purposes of this discussion, we might include in this
second group everyone who does not occupy a position of official
responsibility. We are, however, most interested in those citizens
who are sufficiently prominent that anything they may say or do
.will carry weight. In this group will be found radio commentators,
editorial writers, people who make up the headlines in newspapers,
college professors, clergymen, lawyers, and lecturers of all kinds. We
should also include corporation executives, labor leaders and others
who can on occasion quiet the fears of the people or arouse them to
a~tion, wise or otherwise. However, we may err in placing emphasis
on the more vocal social groups. Sometimes the masses have an uncanny way of sensing where their own true interests lie and then
pu·rsuing those interests despite press, pulpit and platform.
During a great war, it is important to maintain among the
people full confidence in the good intentions, character, and wisdom of the government. This should not, however, necessarily be a
blind, uncritical confidence. The criticism should always be present,
but it must be of a constructive nature aimed to improve rather
than to undermine our position, animated by a keen desire to further the ultimate general welfare of all concerned, and determined
to bripg support to the government when needed. One of the great
dangers in time of crisis undoubtedly is the mistake of regarding
any criticism as objectionable. Often essential changes involving the

70

TnE JVIrnNESOTA AcADE:MY oF ScIENCE

displacement of incompetent, dilatory or shortsighted officials or the
remedy of serious _situations become possible only as a result of
pressure of aroused opinion.
An important aspect of popular morale should be the determination of those who voice the popular wishes to put an end to conflicts of interest between pressure groups. Undertakings of great
national concern must not be blocked because vested interests
either of labor or of capital are temporarily or permanently endangered. For example, delays have occurred in the construction of
land transportation facilities connecting the United States with
Alaska - facilities which should have been begun as soon as the
present crisis became acute. These delays have been due in considerable part at least to the opposition of other transportation facilities which will be or believe that they will be adversely affected.
Only pressure of public opinion can remedy such conditions because
representatives of such pressure groups frequently occupy key positions in the government.
Leaders of opinion should be on the watch to prevent the development of forces or movements which might affect adversely the
attitudes of any considerable group, especially minority groups. A
good illustration of this sort of thing can be drawn from the first
Great War. Public condemnation then was drawn in particular toward two groups. One consisted of critics of the existing social and
economic order popularly grouped together as Reds. The other was
the negro. As an aftermath of the war, then, we had racial acts
involving in some cases the lynching of negroes. A hysterical hunt
for Reds also took place, and the repercussions of the Tom Mooney
trial have scarcely died down in our own day. The State of ·washington saw rioting of a serious nature. Indeed the aftermath of the
war was chiefly a crusade to put the Reds in jail, the public rapidly
losing interest in the Germans as soon as their military power collapsed. Anything that injures minorities or groups that suffer discrimination tends to undermine the morale of the people who are
discriminated against and casts doubt on the sincerity of professed
ideals for which the war is being fought. Majorities then must restrain themselves in time of war even more than in time of peace.
On the other hand sentimentalism must not interfere with necessary
control of possible fifth columnists. For example, observe the protests now being raised in certain quarters to the policies of the
F.B.I. and the Army for the control of Japanese residents in California. Thus, the people must strive for unity by dispensing justice
to all and they must support, criticise, and stimulate their elected
represen ta ti ves.
In wartime the government must bear the greater responsibility
for maintenance of morale because it controls most of the factors
which determine or at least greatly influence the development of
morale, including most sources of information, and what is far
more important, in considerable degree the procession of events.
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First among the governmental factors demanding investigation
must be the conduct of party politics during wartime. An administration needs support from among its own partisans. It also needs
the intelligent and constructive criticism of the opposition. No administration should forget, as has on occasion happened, that it
~hould lead the whole nation and not merely the pai·ty. Neither
patriotism or morale demands that we follow the administration,
right or wrong.
Two changes then should appear in the conduct of ·party politics in wartime. First, the opposition should abandon obstructive
or filibustering tactics and all opposition desigr;ied merely to block
the plans of opponents or to discredit their motives or policies. If
they would confine themselves to constructive criticism and attacks
on major blunders or inadequacies, they would render enormous
service to the country a.nd probably also in the long run further
their own party purposes.
The Administration on the other hand must be willing to appoint men of outstanding ability to high civil and military command on the merit basis only with-no regard to past or prospective
party services. A good example from past history of the correct policy is to be found in Presid~nt Lincoln's appointment of General
McClellan to command the Army of the Potomac. McClellan was
appointed because Lincoln regarded him as an officer of outslanding
capacity who would create a great Army. President Lincoln appointed General McClellan in spite of the fact that he was a political opponent and a personal critic. On the other hand, in 1917, the
United States Army possessed an officer with a distinguished reputation in General Leonard Wood. This officer was never appointed
to an important overseas command, and it was widely believed at
the time that the only reason was resentment entertained by the
President or by his advisers over Wood's criticisms of their policies.
Further, the Administration also should be expected to abandon
during wartime merely partisan maneuvers whose primary purpose
is entrenchment in power or to secure offices for supporters and
party members. The recent speech of the Attorney General in which
he urged increased exertions for the party violates the principles of
sound morale.
The maintenance of morale among the people in wartime involves due attention to proper living conditions among the people.
Factors involved must include adequate living space, attention to
environmental conditions affecting health, attention to the food requirements of the people, and emphasis upon environmental factors
affecting security ,of employment and mental health. Here probably
the government in wartime must go further along the line of social
control than has been thought proper in democratic countries. Undoubtedly, great emphasis must be laid upon minimum standards
and also upon maximum standards in order to maintain morale .
. The people at war expect limitations. Undoubtedly, people will
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conform wholeheartedly to all reasonable restrictions. If the Great
War of 1917 furnishes any criteria, it is evident that people are more
than willing to accept limitations. To maintain morale during a
long war, the government must do two things. First, it must itself
abide by the restrictions ,vhich it places upon the people. It cannot
expect people to go with less sugar and less candy if it permits ex:
tensive boondoggling and waste on the part of its own employees.
Secondly, it must suppress racketeering and extensive evasions of
its regulations on the part of corporations, labor unions, farm organizations, and individuals with political influence.
Morale then is not to be confused with mere enthusiasm generated by parades and spectacles. Neither is it unity of opinion.
Rather it is a willingness to place the general welfare above selfish
personal and group interests.
In wartime the government controls the sources of information.
It can use this control to maintain morale and to destroy morale. In
a democracy the people insist on knowing what is going on. People
are intelligent enough to realize that much information of vital
strategic nature must he suppressed for days or weeks or even
months, because otherwise the enemy will be assisted. Under such
conditions the suppression of information will not undermine morale. The government must understand, however, that nothing can
he hid permanently. It must not permit the suppression of information merely to cover up the errors of important departments and
officials. An excellent example of this sort of thing occurred in the
Great War of 1917. Here the Airplane Production Program was one
of the great failures of the war. This failure was not only concealed
but glowing reports had appeared concerning successful airplane
production. The true situation was finally revealed on the floor of
the Senate by Senator Sutherland of Oregon who was immediately
denounced in the press as a pro-German. In time he was being commended as a patriot, but the exposure came too late to save the
Airplane Production Program which fell far short of expectations.
This revelation did not undermine morale because most other government departments were reasonably successful. If, however, a
government should suppress information concerning several such
conditions and then have them burst forth one at a time, the confidence of the people in the integrity and competence of their leaders might be destroyed.
In developing proper morale the government must consider not
only the war but also the post-war period and of the two, the latter
may well be the most difficult because the post-war period is not
only largely unpredictable but also different. In the past, wars have
been followed by booms and_ by depressions, by violent revolutions
and by black reaction. They have also been followed by widespread
political corruption and seldom by constructive political advance.
Some people believe that one or more of the conditions just mentioned will follow the present war. Perhaps all of them will follow,

PROCEEDINGS, VOLUME TEN,

1942

73

some being characteristic of one part of the world while others
dominate in other lands. In the United States the Civil War was
followed by political corruption and incapacity although the party
that fought the war remained in power. After the first World War,
on the other hand, the political party which fought the war was
ousted but nevertheless a period of political corruption followed.
During the first World War Creel succeeded very well at the head
of the Committee on Public Information during the war period but
not so well in preparing for the post-war period. Perhaps too much
was promised resulting in disillusionment. Unfortunately some
things were said which were untrue and the results are with us yet.
It has apparently been difficult to convince many people that the
Japanese have used Chinese prisoners of war for bayonet practice
because they remember the untrue statements concerning Belgian
children with their hands cut off.
In the nature of things, the post-war period is bound to be difficult. Allies over whom we have slight or no control may prove to be
too grasping as was the case of Japan after the last war. And further, if unsound economic policies are employed by powerful governments, no amount of morale building can ward off the inevitable
consequences.
In order to maintain the morale, the government must advocate
sound aims for fighting the war. The people must be convinced not
only that they are fighting in a just cause for adequate ends but
also that the government is sincere in presenting these objectives
and that it will not later be overruled by selfish, sinister groups
either at home or abroad. President Wilson presented effective war
aims in 1917 which helped greatly both at home and abroad in pi·o, moting victory. They were, however, phrased in such vague terms
that later on trouble arose in applying them. Abraham Lincoln did
extremely well in presenting the aims of our Civil War.
Today, of course, we are faced with a more complex situation.
No one, I think, believes that the ultimate objectives of such different nations as Russia, China, the British Empire, and the United
States are easy to reconcile. However, if the people are to fight with
enthusiasm, the war aims of the Administration should possess several characteristics.
First, the people must be convinced that they are not fighting
for selfish, imperialistic interests-either of our own country or of
others.
Second, they must also. feel that the war will be followed by a
sincere and earnest attempt to create a more satisfactory world.
Third, people must feel that they are fighting in a war which will
bring definite, concrete advantages. It was possibly an error of judgment of President Wilson in the First World War to announce that
the United States would seek no advantage of any kind. Perhaps it
would have been much better if he had demanded the bases from
Newfoundland to Trinidad which President Roosevelt recently se-
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cured in exchange for fifty destroyers and if these bases had been
immediately fortified for the protection of the country. Perhaps it
would also have been better if he had demanded the bases in the
lVIarshall Islands which were later turned over to Japan and which
have now been used to attack us. Renunciation of selfish, imperialistic aims involving the conquest and subjugation of alien people is
not necessarily irreconcilable with a desire to secure definite advantages for one's country.
Fourth, they must not promise the impossible. Otherwise postwar disillusionment will be accentuated.
Fifth, war aims must undermine enemy morale.
Sixth, war aims must bind the allies together.
Some of these aims are hard to reconcile. Merely to enumerate
them indicates the difficult problem which an administration faces
-the problem of setting forth war aims which will at the same time
stiffen popular morale for the war period and provide a sound and
workable program for a difficult and very different post war period.
If the government is to maintain a high morale, there is no better injunction than to quote the words of President Lincoln in appointing General Hooker to the command of the Army of the Potomac, "God forward and give us victories." But the people must
stand firm while victory is being prepared. That must involve a
program of useful work for everyone. Only as everyone is personally
a participant in useful work that contributes to victory will everyone also feel the buoyant enthusiasm and confidence that is the
essence of sound morale.

MEASURING NATIONAL MORALE
F. STUART CH,APIN
University of Minnesota

lVIorale has come to be a factor of prime importance in organization for a total war. Time was when the civilian population remained an inactive mass in war time, since professional soldiers
alone conducted the fighting. Now the entire civilian population is
harnessed to the war effort. The fighting forces are selected from
the population by conscription, industrial workers are assigned to
definite tasks in the production of military equipment and supplies,
volunteers-women as well as men-are recruited for a variety of
civilian defense services, prices and wages are subject to government regulation, savings of surplus income are channelized into the
purchase of war bonds, and income taxes reach down to the lower
levels of earning. But all this regimentation of individual behavior
is accompanied in a democracy with the necessity of keeping a
highly literate people informed about the goals of the war effort and
the current events that mark off steps toward achieving the goals. ,

